worse_finder: every app container on iOS, one symlink away
When worse_query dropped on 8 November, Binance warned users, SlowMist repeated it, and the headlines made it sound like the iPhone sandbox was gone. I read the source that evening because I wanted to know what it actually reaches on a current device. The next day I put it on an iPhone 17 running iOS 27.2 and started probing.
Every app on an iPhone keeps its files in a container under /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<uuid>. The sandbox stops other apps from opening that directory. App Groups are the deliberate exception. An app and its extensions can share a group container, and containermanagerd issues sandbox extensions so they can read and write it. The kernel accepts whatever token containermanagerd hands back.
Taj C (forcequit) built worse_query on that trust. No kernel bug is involved. An app with any App Group entitlement deletes its group's Library/Caches, replaces it with a symlink, and asks containermanagerd for an extension on that part of its container. The manager resolves the symlink and issues a token for the target without checking that the target is still inside the container. No CVE was assigned, Apple has not mentioned it in an advisory, and the author says 27.2.1 and 27.3 beta 1 still work.
The bug
The query names a part of the container, not a path. Part 3 is Library/Caches. The app removes the directory, creates the symlink, then asks for the token:
query_set_part(query, 3); // Library/Caches
unlink(caches);
symlink("/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<uuid>", caches);
result = query_get_single_result(query); // containermanagerd, over XPC
token = copy_sandbox_token(result); // class;...;path
sandbox_extension_consume(token); // read-write on <uuid>
containermanagerd resolves the part through the filesystem and mints an extension for the resolved path. The token class is com.apple.app-sandbox.read-write, the generic read-write class, so one token covers app containers and App Groups, plus some system groups on iOS 27. The kernel does what the token says. The manager should not have issued it.
The missing check is to canonicalize the requested path, confirm it is a descendant of the container root, and refuse if it is not. A correct fix also has to handle the app swapping the symlink between the check and the use, since the app owns that symlink.
bad_query, from August, was the same idea with the traversal in the part domain. Apple validated that field. worse_query leaves the part domain alone and moves the traversal into the filesystem, after validation has run.
What I could reach
I started with the boundary. On 27.2, from a signed app with an App Group, I listed the App Group parent directory (121 entries), read the 11 KB com.apple.MobileGestalt.plist from systemgroup.com.apple.mobilegestaltcache, and found 239 app containers with a bounded inode scan in under a second. fsgetpath() returns a path for an inode number, so the scan walks inode numbers instead of guessing 36-character UUIDs. The MobileGestalt plist was the surprise. A normal app should not be able to read it at all.
Parent directories are refused with -6. /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application lists nothing; only its children are reachable. App bundles under /var/containers/Bundle/Application are refused too. The Keychain is not part of this, because securityd gates those items by access group and the filesystem sandbox never sees them. This is a filesystem escape, not a jailbreak: it reads and writes files but never runs code outside the app.
What the escape is worth depends on what each app writes to disk. A wallet that keeps seeds in the Keychain is not exposed by this bug. A wallet that writes a seed phrase or an API token to a plist is. Both covered the warning; neither covered which wallets are exposed.
The app
Console output gets old, so I wrote worse_finder: a Finder for the containers. It maps UUIDs to bundle IDs by parsing lsd's CSStore2 database, shows folders with sizes and symlink targets, exports containers as streaming ZIP64 archives, and serves the same listing over HTTPS on port 8443 behind a generated 160-bit password. On my device the scan finds 272 containers in about four seconds, 248 of them with a display name.
It is about 3,200 lines of Swift and Objective-C, most of it written with DeepSeek. The escape is one C function. The rest is a file browser and a ZIP writer. Anyone who can describe a table view and a recursive directory listing can build this in a weekend. The hard parts had nothing to do with the bug. LaunchServices refuses to enumerate apps, so names and icons only come back one bundle ID at a time, and iconDataForVariant: returns the same 16 KB placeholder for every app. I gave up on real icons and used gradient initials.
Links
https://github.com/melvinsh/worse_finder
https://github.com/forcequitOS/worse_query
https://github.com/kolbicz/WQFiles
https://blog.ostorlab.co/worse-query-ios-sandbox-escape.html
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/binance-warns-of-ios-sandbox-escape.html